Over the next few weeks, YouTube and NBCUniversal will likely go to the mattresses over a traditional carriage dispute. Historically, these negotiations have generally been resolved behind closed doors, though they do occasionally devolve into public spats involving short blackouts and ads from both sides urging customers to call up the other party and express their displeasure. But this time, flags are being planted, and it’s possible that both sides will dig in for a protracted fight. NBCU’s Matt Strauss thinks YouTube is asking for too much—reduced affiliate fees, the ability to package Peacock programming—while Justin Connolly, who oversees YouTube TV’s partnership business, thinks it’s unfair that NBCU charges consumers less for access to content via Peacock than YouTube TV pays for it.

Indeed, this showdown with NBCU may be a watershed moment for YouTube’s traditional TV ambitions. How much leverage do Mohan and Google C.E.O. Sundar Pichai have in their pursuit of building the ultimate destination for all TV viewers, and how far are traditional players willing to go to not become serfs in YouTube’s growing empire?

Google finds itself in a bit of a chicken-and-egg situation. With around 10 million subscribers, YouTube TV is the largest virtual TV provider (v.M.V.P.D.) in the United States, and the fourth-largest pay TV provider overall. But just like any other distributor, it’s dependent on a steady stream of engaging content. That’s especially true for virtual TV platforms like YouTube TV, which can have up to twice the average churn rate of streaming platforms, per Antenna. So NBCU has some cards to play. Since none of its games from the various leagues it carries are exclusive to any one cable provider, in the event of a blackout, NBCU could simply point customers to another service entirely. When Disney was fighting with Charter right before football season, its distribution team sent customers to YouTube TV and Hulu + Live TV, trying to make the point that Disney didn’t need them as much as Charter needed ESPN.

YouTube’s main advantage, of course, is its parentage. Alphabet is a nearly $3 trillion company that won’t live or die on the revenue from YouTube TV. YouTube itself contributed more than $8 billion a quarter to Alphabet’s total revenues in its most recent quarter, accounting for roughly 10 percent of its total revenue. YouTube TV accounts for nowhere close to that figure. But, as Rich Greenfield recently noted, for NBCU to lose “about 15 percent of its video subscriber base, even if a meaningful portion is recaptured by competitors or DTC streaming apps, would be quite painful.”

Consider that a portion of those hypothetical lost customers may choose to not sign up for any service, impacting overall viewership, and that NBCU receives significant revenue from its YouTube partnership. Greenfield estimates that YouTube is paying roughly $10 per sub each month. Forgoing $100 million per month, even if a portion can be recaptured, while trying to crack the Peacock growth problem and dropping $2.5 billion a year on NBA rights, is enough to make NBCU execs reach for the Mylanta.

Although NBCU is at the center of this week’s fight, it’s not the only company that will face a decision like this. Mohan’s long game is seemingly getting Peacock content ingested into YouTube TV and/or made available through Primetime Channels, which YouTube could then make discoverable through the YouTube TV interface. After all, content hosting may be a far better business than content creation. Just ask Amazon or Apple, both of which offer redistributed content through their respective digital storefronts and take 30 percent of first-year signup fees (and a percentage of advertising inventory) in exchange.

YouTube wants to be in the same business, and for good reason. It pays $2 billion a year for Sunday Ticket, which is a significant boost to its Primetime Channels business but costs more than any of the advertiser-supported, user-generated content available on the main YouTube app. (YouTube did once try to produce its own original content, but gave up after just a few years.) It’s a major win if YouTube can ingest sought-out content without having to pay for exclusive rights and build user habits in its own product ecosystem.

Meanwhile, content production costs for everyone else are continuing to rise—making the revenue that companies like NBCU and Disney receive from YouTube more important now than ever. On the other hand, if NBCU folds here and gives YouTube what it wants, wouldn’t that just further cement Alphabet’s monopoly in video, thereby threatening their very existence?