And now, it’s the resee…

We’re living through an unapologetic economic era when even the most historic incumbents are getting humbled—Paramount was sold for a song, and Warner Bros. faces assimilation; the White House is morphing into a conference center; Saks is working through its post-bankruptcy blues, etcetera. And now, nearly two years into its own grinding turnaround, Nike C.E.O. Elliott Hill announced this week that the company would be slashing its third-party e-commerce presence in China. In some ways, the pivot from Asia was inevitable. Even before Donald Trump imposed a new set of ostensibly SCOTUS-proof tariffs, brands had already endured weakening sales in China. Many industry observers had hoped the world’s second-largest consumer market would offset declining demand from wealthy Middle Eastern shoppers impacted by the Iran war. Now, it seems Hill will have to look elsewhere.

Nike’s shaky position in China arguably demanded some kind of course correction. Sales fell 12 percent in the quarter ending in May, as domestic rivals like Anta and Li-Ning continued to chip away at its market share. But instead of broadening distribution to regain visibility, Nike is narrowing its channels. The company has told most of its retail partners in China to sell its products only in stores. Consumers shopping online for a pair of Air Max sneakers will now find them only on Nike’s own website or its branded storefronts on Tmall, JD.com, and Douyin.

In some ways, Nike’s new China playbook echoes the D.T.C. push championed by former C.E.O.s Mark Parker and John Donahoe. Back in 2022, Nike believed that severing ties with Foot Locker and shifting to online sales would supercharge margins. Instead, the plan backfired: Growth slowed, and the company is still dealing with the consequences. Now Hill is making a similar bet in a market where strong online and offline retail partnerships are essential. It’s definitely a choice, and the logic does make a kind of sense. If sales aren’t recovering in China, tighter distribution offers greater control over its market positioning.

But as a former Nike insider once told me, the sportswear behemoth’s real problem in China is its prices. Global revenue from Nike’s running category was up 20 percent year over year in the first half of fiscal 2026. In China, however, consumers have been skipping Nike’s new $295 Alphafly running shoe and instead buying Li-Ning’s $159 Feidian 3 Challenger—a product many believe is just as good for almost half the price. That’s a harder problem to solve, and it won't get any easier with a smaller selling network.

The other major development this week surrounded Reformation’s forthcoming I.P.O., which could value the company at as much as $1 billion. As Lauren and I discussed on Fashion People, Reformation is one of the rare brands that has sustained genuine momentum because people actually like the product, rather than approachable prices or particularly showy marketing. Just as important, 90 percent of its revenue comes from direct channels, insulating it from the whims of a tattered wholesale market.

Still, it’s a bit harder to make the case for Reformation’s financial performance. Revenue climbed 16 percent to $507 million in 2025, but net profit fell 62 percent year over year to just $13 million. (Remember when fashion startups like Warby Parker and Allbirds went public with nothing but losses?) In the quarter that ended in March, Reformation posted a $12 million net loss. The I.P.O. prospectus projects at least $11 million in profits for the quarter that ended in June. I’m not sure how appealing that inconsistency will be to institutional investors already prone to undervaluing consumer brands with even far more reliable top and bottom lines.

Ahead of next week’s earnings reports from LVMH, Kering, and Hermès, several smaller luxury groups offered an early glimpse of the sector. The undeniable winner was Mulberry, which posted a 23 percent year-over-year sales increase in the first quarter. As I reported on Wednesday, C.E.O. Andrea Baldo’s strategy of returning the brand to its directional, heritage-driven roots is already reshaping consumer expectations ahead of Christopher Kane’s first collection as creative director in September.

The Zegna group showed how the right creative leadership can preserve healthy growth, even when the business isn’t quite there yet. Haider Ackermann’s critically praised, media-savvy work at Tom Ford led to a 5 percent revenue year-over-year bump in the first quarter. At the flagship Zegna, Alessandro Sartori drove a 17 percent sales increase, a sign that luxury shoppers respond to a meticulous devotion to fabrics and materials. Thom Browne, meanwhile, kept second quarter sales flat through a strong D.T.C. push and expanded sportswear, despite wholesale revenue plummeting 30 percent.

Moncler’s picture is fuzzier. The group reported a 9 percent sales increase in the first half of the year, with Stone Island rising 11 percent at constant exchange rates. Moncler’s European sales, meanwhile, dropped 4 percent—as the planet gets hotter, the brand needs to expand beyond its heritage as the winter coat—although sales across regions were up 9 percent. But investors were unconvinced, and Moncler’s stock was down 8 percent at market close on Wednesday.

Of course, the market will do what it wants to do. But the real question is whether executive chairman Remo Ruffini will push to buy another brand to round out the Moncler portfolio. The more labels, the further the group can reduce its reliance on Moncler’s puffers.

On the future of wholesale: “It will be intriguing to see how the LuisaViaRoma relaunch plays out. They say they want to focus on global ecommerce sales, but they'll need to understand that they need to hone a real  point of view—or they risk just competing on price. It's a veritable U-turn from their past.” —a marketer

On the Selfridges challenge: “Selfridges’ DNA has been high/middle for decades. When Vittorio Radice took over Selfridges in 1996, his vision was that Londoners could pick up a cappuccino and a paper (ha! that dates things) on the way to work and have dinner in the evening and shop all the way through the day. He wanted it to be part of the culture of London. Nick Cross, Vittorio’s super talented marketing director, introduced in-store experiences (like when they had naked people going up and down the escalators as part of their Body Craze campaign) because they had no money for advertising. Nick was also the man behind the yellow shopping bags and bold logo. He figured that the bags would be outdoor marketing for him. All normal stuff now, but in ’96 it was extraordinary.” —a British journalist

More on the Selfridges challenge from the same British journalist: “What’s my point? I don’t think you can align Selfridges with Harvey Nichols. It really is a London destination. The basement and food are both crazy busy, as is beauty. That back beauty hall, with all the niche brands, is still the only place on Oxford St. for beauty addicts—regardless of Space NK’s shop at Oxford Circus, or John Lewis’s beauty hall (which is better than it was, but still pretty dull). What Selfridges could never do is get people up beyond the third floor. The building is soooo big, and they never really made it in interiors—so to turn all that dead space into a club is genius. The situation they are in now, they’ve been in before. As long as they think as a cultural icon and not only as a retailer they should be okay. It is a really fun place to shop, and people literally come for the buzz.” —the same British journalist

Have a great weekend,
Lauren

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