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Welcome back to What I’m Hearing+. I’m Julia Alexander.
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Hello from Los Angeles, where I am stationed for the week to see clients. It finally snowed (briefly) in New York—something I missed for a total of about five minutes. (And I’m Canadian…)
Tonight: dispelling the myth of the co-exclusive, a term that traditional studios are using to rationalize licensing shows to streamers. Theoretically, these deals allow legacy media players to both monetize library content and leverage a larger platform to raise awareness of the title. But, alas, it doesn’t often work out that way…
But first…
- Assessing the Netflix “decline”: Last week, reports suggested that time spent streaming TV and movies in 2023 declined by 7 billion hours compared to 2022—a 17 percent drop. But what does this mean? And how does this data cohere with the larger—seemingly incongruent—economic reality? In 2022, after all, Netflix’s stock cratered by half and ushered in a great correction for both the company and the industry. These days, of course, its market capitalization is sitting at around $208 billion, making it 20 percent larger than Disney.
In recent years, Netflix has become more transparent with its data, which has helped analysts (to a degree) assess the efficiency of its content spend. Back in the old days, when Netflix was more coy, we could only estimate completed views based on the limited numbers it did report—such as the fact that 78 million households watched The Old Guard in its first four weeks of release back in 2020. The issue: Netflix considered two minutes of consumption a “view.” Netflix even had categories for different viewers: beginners (less than 2 minutes), watchers (more than 70 percent of a title), and completers (more than 90 percent). Then Netflix rolled out the Top 10 list, which looked at total hours viewed for a title, before it shifted once again last June to include a ranking by “total views”—a subtle move suggesting that engagement was more important than simple interest. That’s a lot of change in a short amount of time, making year-over-year analysis a little more complicated.
Simply put, it’s not fair to compare two data sets where the rules have changed. Navigating these contextual aspects of data analysis will become increasingly important as other companies start releasing, modifying, and reworking their own data sets. It’s going to get a lot more complicated.
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| And now, on to the main event… |
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| I probably don’t need to tell you that Young Sheldon is popular. The series was averaging 7.15 million weekly viewers on CBS last March—not bad for a sitcom in its seventh year. Its success on Max is a little more clouded without data, but considering The Big Bang Theory has charted on Nielsen’s Top 10 for Max, the recommendation algorithm likely spills over to its spinoff. But when Young Sheldon debuted on Netflix in December as part of a “co-exclusive” arrangement between the streamer and the show’s owner Warner Bros., it scored 963 million minutes watched in its first week, and doubled to 1.8 billion minutes in the second—some 20x the minutes watched on Max the week before, according to ratings journalist TV Grim Reaper.
“Co-exclusive” is the new P.R. term of art deployed to describe not-actually-exclusive licensing arrangements between legacy studios, like Warners or Paramount or Disney, and pure-play streamers, like Netflix and Amazon. On some level, there’s an economic logic to these deals: Large media companies with barely profitable streamers and mountains of debt need to amortize their catalogs while paying lip service to their streaming brand. And if a title isn’t performing well on its own platform, why not syndicate it elsewhere and hope that renewed interest can juice value? (Let’s call that the Suits Strategy.) |
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A MESSAGE FROM OUR SPONSOR
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FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION: MAX, presenting the HBO Original Going to Mars: The Nikki Giovanni Project. A look at the life of poet, Nikki Giovanni and the revolutionary historical periods through which she lived, from the Civil Rights Movement to Black Lives Matter. Now Streaming on Max. |
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| However, there is very little evidence that co-exclusives benefit the owner of the content in any manner beyond cash; what’s still to be determined is if that matters to the licensing party. I noted last month that only 9 percent of people who watched Suits subsequently watched anything afterward on Peacock, where the final season was streaming exclusively. Only a small number of new superfans had a compelling enough reason to flip to or stay on Peacock; there are so many similar shows elsewhere. Also, there is natural audience dropoff with longer series. Between June 19, when Suits first premiered on Netflix, and Dec. 31, the first season dominated the U.S. Top 10 list for a total of 11 weeks. Season 2 appeared for nine weeks, Season 3 stuck around for six, Season 4 popped for two, and the remainder never charted at all. |
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| This is obviously problematic for licensors. With the exception of Netflix, all the major streamers lost billions of dollars in the arms race for exclusive, original content on their platforms. Now, in the race to patch their P&Ls by licensing titles to Netflix, they’re losing customers, too. The average churn rate for platforms including Disney+, Hulu, Max, Paramount+, Peacock, and more rose from 5.1 percent in Nov. 2022 to an average of 6.3 percent in Nov. 2023.
There is a legitimate rationale for licensing to Netflix, even if it means eroding the perceived exclusivity of I.P. and brands. Warner Bros. Discovery recently attained profitability in its streaming division with this very strategy. If the goal is to boost revenue in the short term in order to rebuild content pipelines or pivot programming strategies, then “co-exclusivity” deals could be the smart play. |
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| But with co-exclusivity, the value of a shared title isn’t shared equally. Unless or until there’s a significant correction in the economic terms of these licensing deals, they are almost certainly more beneficial to the larger platform. Meanwhile, many of these platforms aren’t using the borrowed time to reboot fast enough. Disney+ has canceled nearly every original, big-budget, live-action title outside of the Marvel and Star Wars universe, and is slowing down the release of those titles to protect its biggest brands. Peacock has had a couple of hits, like Poker Face, but hasn’t proven itself outside of NFL simulcasting and the Olympics—and many canceled as soon as the Games finished. Paramount+ hasn’t had any hits outside of its Yellowstone and Star Trek franchises (we can debate Halo later), according to Nielsen. (Paramount has also licensed nearly all of its Star Trek films to Max, where they are now streaming exclusively.)
And that’s the issue: There simply aren’t enough intriguing series to entice the volume of customers these companies need. Meanwhile, they’re giving Netflix ammo to reduce its own churn even as it raises prices so it can invest in more content. Netflix isn’t perfect, of course: Its original film strategy is a mess (Rebel Moon reportedly cost north of $200 million and generated less than 60 million completed views in its first two weeks, surpassed by Sony’s The Equalizer 3 in its third week); its expansion in India has yet to pay off; and Netflix’s live events and sports strategy is still in flux.
But these aren’t existential crises, especially when everyone else is in far worse shape. Paramount is licensing Yellowstone to Netflix internationally, and movies like Warners’ The Meg 2 are appearing on Netflix not long after playing in theaters. It’s challenging, and there’s no easy answer—studios need cash to pay for streaming, which they can’t seem to quit, and they have tons of largely unwatched content that would be better monetized by Netflix or Amazon on a nonexclusive (sorry, “co-exclusive”) basis. At least then somebody will be watching it. |
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| FOUR STORIES WE’RE TALKING ABOUT |
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